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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
As the judicial interpretation of the restraining statutes has thus
evolved, if a borrower gives his note for $1,000 to a non-banking cor-
porate lender who supplies him with $940 cash, there has been an
illegal discount and the note is void. If the borrower instead makes
his note for $1;000 with interest at 6%6 and receives $1,000 in cash
from the lender, no discount being involved, the note is valid.
Although these two cases are clear cut, the line of distinction
is not nearly as apparent in other instances. Suppose the lender were
to ask for two notes, one for $1,000 representing the amount of the
loan and a separate note for the $60 charge. If the note for the prin-
cipal and the note for interest cannot be separated and the entire
transaction involves an illegal discount, what is the status of corporate
bonds with interest coupons attached if purchased by corporate
underwriters ? 29
The statutes under consideration are an example of the special
protection generally afforded to banks in the area of lending.30 The
instant case points out the need for a critical re-examination of the
"Restraining Acts" in the light of present day economic and com-
mercial activities. Lending by a non-banking corporation does not
create a deposit and have the indirect effects on the economy which
monetary regulation is designed to control.3 1 Therefore, a more
modified restriction of lending and discounting by non-banking cor-
porations may be sufficient.
M
rNSURANcE-Co-OPERATION CLAUSE-VERIFICATION OF THIRD-
PARTY CoMPLAINT.-Plaintiff-insurer brought this action to have a
policy declared forfeit. The mother of defendant-insured was the
driver of his car in an accident wherein defendant's father was killed.
Defendant's mother, as executrix, then sued defendant for wrongful
death for his imputed negligence. 1 Plaintiff undertook to defend in-
sured, but insured refused to verify a cross-complaint against his
mother. The Court held that the co-operation clause binding defen-
dant to "... assist . . . in the conduct of suits," did not obligate
29 See Kripke, Illegal "Discounts" By Non-Banking Corporations -in New
York, 56 CoLum. L. REv. 1183, 1192-93 (1956).
so Although a usurious instrument is void and no action may be maintained
thereon (N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 373) a bank may recover the principal of. a
note (N.Y. BANKING LAW § 108). See Schlesinger v. Gilhooly, 189 N.Y. 1,
81 N.E. 619 (1907).S 1Kripke, supra note 29, at 1196; .Kupfer, Prohibited Discounts Under the
Banking and General Corporation Laws, 12 RPEom) 30, 45-46 (1957).
1 N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIc LAW § 59.
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insured to verify a cross-complaint. American Surety Co. v. Diamond,
1 N.Y.2d 594, 136 N.E.2d 876 (1956).
In liability insurance 2 it early became apparent that the insurer
had a strong interest in the defense made by the insured. This was
necessarily so in a type of-insurance where the liability of the company
depended upon the successful conclusion of the injured party's suit
against the insured. Without a clause binding the insured to co-
operate in the defense of the action against him, an insurer would be
practically at the mercy of the participants in an accident.3 To meet
this need the co-operation clause evolved.4  The earliest form taken
by the co-operation clause consisted in the requirement of notice that
an accident had taken place. 5 With the impetus of such decisions as
Maryland Casualty Company v. Lamarre,6 the co-operation clause
grew first more common, then more complicated. 7 The co-operation
clause has been upheld so often that the validity of such clauses is no
longer open to question.8 The New York 9 and majority view is that
the co-operation clause is a material condition of the policy and a
condition precedent to liability on the part of the insurer.' 0 In addi-
tion the New York courts have taken the position that a material
breach relieves the insurer of liability, even in the absence of prejudice
2 . [T]hat form of insurance by which insured is indemnified
against loss or liability on account of injuries to property."' State ex rel.
Travelers' Indemnity Co. v. Knott, 114 Fla. 820, 153 So. 304, 306 (1934).3 Durland, Blood and Marital Relationships Under the Cooperation Clause,
312 INs. L.J. 3 (1949). See also Rochon v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., 114 Conn.
313, 158 Atl. 815 (1932).
4 See Kindervater v. Motorists Cas. Ins. Co., 120 N.J.L. 373, 199 Atl. 606,
608 (1938).3 Note, 22 NomE DAiE LAW. 118 (1946).
a83 N.H. 206, 140 Atl. 174 (1928). There the court stated that the insured
was not bound to co-operate since no co-operation was expressly required by the
policy.
7 Today the typical co-operation clause is couched in the following language:
"The insured shall cooperate with the Company and, upon the Company's
request, shall attend hearings and trials and shall assist in effecting settlements,
securing and giving evidence, obtaining the attendance of witnesses and in the
conduct of suits. The insured shall not, except at his own cost, voluntarily
make any payment, assume any obligation, or incur any expense other than for
such immediate medical and surgical relief to others as shall be imperative at
the time of accident." Durland, Blood and Marital Relationships Under the
Cooperation Clause, 312 INs. L.J. 3 (1949). See also American Surety Co. v.
Diamond, 1 N.Y.2d 594, 596, 136 N.E2d 876, 878 (1956).
8 See Durland, supra note 7, at 3. See, e.g., Schoenfeld v. New Jersey
Fidelity and Plate Glass Ins. Co., 203 App. Div. 796, 197 N.Y. Supp. 606
(2d Dep't 1922) ; Watkins v. Watkins, 210 Wis. 606, 245 N.W. 695, 698 (1932).
9 See, e.g., Coleman v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 247 N.Y. 271, 160 N.E.
367 (1928); Century Indemnity Co. v. Hartford Acc. and Indemnity Co., 130
N.Y.S.2d 844, 847 (Suo. Ct 1951).
20 Whittle v. Assoc. Indemnity Corp., 130 N.J.L. 576, 33 A.2d 866 (1943);
Martin v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 258 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
Contra, Woodman v. Pacific Indemnity Co., 33 Cal. App. 2d 321, 91 P.2d 898(1939); Houran v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., 109 Vt. 258, 195 At. 253 (1937).
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to the insurer." Some jurisdictions, however, hold that lack of co-
operation only constitutes a defense if the insurer has been substan-
tially prejudiced thereby.' 2
The cases involving breach of a co-operation clause fall into
several broad categories. Outstanding among these is that where the
insured, by fraud and collusive conduct, assists the plaintiff in the
maintenance of his suit, rather than the insurer.13 Such conduct in-
cludes false statements, 14 false testimony, 15 and voluntarily entering a
jurisdiction so process could be served.' Harmless acts done without
malice, however, such as waiving personal service of process,' 7 or
engaging an attorney for a relative,' 8 have been held not to constitute
a breach. Nor does the mere fact of a close relationship or friendship
between the parties constitute a breach; "I although it has been held
that under such circumstances the evidence should be examined with
great particularity.20
Closely allied with, and in some cases overlapping, collusion are
the cases involving misrepresentation and nondisclosure of factS.
2
'
Misrepregentations that the insured had not been drinking,2 2 that
11 See Wenig v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co., 294 N.Y. 195, 61 N.E.2d 442
(1945); Coleman v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 247 N.Y. 271, 160 N.E. 367(1928).
12 See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Koval, 146 F.2d 118
(10th Cir. 1944); Hynding v. Home Acc. Ins. Co., 214 Cal. 743, 752, 7 P.2d
999, 1002 (1932) ; Rochon v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., 118 Conn. 190, 171 Atl.
429 (1934); Conroy v. Commercial Gas. Ins. Co., 292 Pa. 219, 140 At. 905(1928).
13 See, e.g., State Automobile Mut. Ins. Co. v. York, 104 F.2d 730 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 308 U.S. 591 (1939); Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Richardson,
81 F. Supp. 310 (S.D. Ill. 1948) ; Luntz v. Stern, 135 Ohio St. 225, 20 N.E.2d
241 (1939); Buckner v. Buckner, 207 Wis. 303, 241 N.W. 342 (1932).
'4 Western Cas. & Surety Co. v. Weimar, 96 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1938).
15 See Medico v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., 132 Me. 422, 172
Adt. 1 (1934). See also Storer v. Ocean Acc. & Guarantee Corp., 80 F.2d 470,
472 (6th Cir. 1935) ; Beauregard v. Beauregard, 56 Ohio App. 158, 10 N.E.2d
227 (1937).
16 See Ems v. Continental Automobile Ins. Ass'n, 284 S.W. 824 (Mo. App.
1926).
17 Glade v. General Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 216 Iowa 622, 246 N.W. 794 (1933);
Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Beckwith, 74 F.2d 75, 77 (5th Cir. 1934) (dictum).
18 New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Mandel, 115 N.J. Eq. 198, 201-02, 170 AtI.
19, 21 (Ch.) (dictum), aff'd per curiam, 116 N.J. Eq. 48, 172 Atl. 364 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1934).
19 State Automobile Mut. Ins. Co. v. York, 104 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir.)
(dictum), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 591 (1939) ; see Riggs v. New Jersey Fidelity
& Plate Glass Co., 126 Ore. 404, 270 Pac. 479 (1928).
20 See, e.g., Buckner v. Buckner, 207 Wis. 303, 241 N.W. 342 (1932). See
Durland, Blood and Marital Relationships Under the Cooperation Clause, 312
INs. L.J. 3, 4 (1949).
21 See, e.g., Coleman v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 247 N.Y. 271, 160 N.E.
367 (1928); Allegretto v. Oregon Automobile Ins. Co., 140 Ore. 538, 13 P.2d
647, 648 (1932); Francis v. London Guarantee & Acc. Co., 100 Vt. 425, 138
At. 780, 781 (1927).
22 Hunt v. Dollar, 224 Wis. 48, 271 N.W. 405 (1937).
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another drove the automobile at the time of the accident,23 and that a
non-existent person was responsible for the accident 24 were held to
be breaches. So too, inconsistent statements as to fault,25 or the
insured's recollection of the circumstances of the accident 26 were held
a breach of the co-operation clause.
Another group of cases is that including a voluntary assumption
of liability.27 The assumption must be voluntary, however, and a
truthful explanation of the accident and circumstances does not con-
stitute a breach. 28 Variant testimony at the trial 29 or failure of the
insured to attend 3 0 also have often been held breaches of a co-
operation clause. Conflicting statements and testimony regarding the
rental of a motor vehicle, 31 the speed,3 2 and the relative positions of
the automobiles 33 have been held to relieve the insurer of liability.
More closely connected with the instant case is a breach by
refusal to sign or verify pleadings. Although it is well settled that
the insured need not distort or misrepresent the facts,3 4 nor verify a
pleading he believes false; 35 a wilful refusal to verify a pleading is a
breach of the policy.36 The Court was asked to go one step further
23 See Rochon v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., 114 Conn. 313, 158 Atl. 815, 816
(1932); Brogdon v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 290 Mich. 130, 287 N.W.
406 (1939).
24 See Hoffman v. Labutzke, 233 Wis. 365, 289 N.W. 652- (1940).
25 See Storer v. Ocean Acc. & Guarantee Corp., 80 F.2d 470 (6th Cir.
1935) ; Ohrback v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., 227 App. Div. 311, 237 N.Y. Supp.
494 (1st Dep't 1929); Solomon v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., 132 Misc. 134, 229
N.Y. Supp. 257 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1928).
26 Cf. Seltzer v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 252 N.Y. 330, 169 N.E. 403 (1929).
27 See Kesinger v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 101 Colo. 109, 70 P2d 776
(1937); Kindervater v. Motorists Cas. Ins. Co., 120 N.J.L. 373, 199 At. 606,
603 (1938) ; Ridler v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 342 Mo. 677, 117 S.W.2d 241 (1938).
28 Wenig v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co., 294 N.Y. 195, 61 N.E.2d 442 (1945) ;
Porter v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., 40 Cal. App. 2d 502, 104 P.2d 1087
(1940) ; U-Drive-It Car Co. v. Friedman, 153 So. 500 (La. App. 1934) ; Great
Am. Indemnity Co. v. McMenamin, 134 S.W.2d 734, 736-37 (Tex. Civ. App.
1939) (dictum).
29 See Ohrback v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., 227 App. Div. 311, 237 N.Y.
Supp. 494 (1st Dep't 1929); cf. Schields v. London & Lancashire Indemnity
Co., 251 App. Div. 775, 295 N.Y. Supp. 434 (3d Dep't 1937).
30 Goldstein v. Bernstein, 315 Mass. 329, 52 N.E.2d 559 (1943); Horton v.
Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., 25 Tenn. App. 593, 164 S.W.2d 1011, cert.
denied. 179 Tenn. 562, 164 S.W.2d 1016 (1942).
3' Hilliard v. United Pacific Cas. Ins. Co., 195 Wash. 478, 81 P.2d 513
(1938).
32 Wright v. Farmers Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, 39 Cal. App. 2d
70, 102 P.2d 352 (1940).
33 Shafer v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 248 App. Div. 279, 289 N.Y. Supp. 577
(4th Dep't 1936).34 United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Pierson, 89 F.2d 602 (8th Cir.
1937); Employers' Liability Assur. Corp. v. Bodron, 65 F.2d 539 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 290 U.S. 698 (1933) ; Nevil v. Wahl, 228 Mo. App. 49, 65 S.W.2d
123 (1933).
35 Svitak v. Sun Indemnity Co., 136 Neb. 303, 285 N.W. 604 (1939).6.enkinson v. New York Cas. Co., 241 Wis. 328, 6 N.W.2d 192 (1942).
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in the instant case as the insurer contended that the co-operation
clause 3 7 was broad enough to obligate the insured to verify a third-
party complaint.3 8 In addition to the holding that the clause did not
compel verification, the Court also stated that the 'fact that the defen-
dant requested a judicial ruling on the question under Section 546 of
the Civil Practice Act 39 did not constitute a breach and was reasonable
under the circumstances. Thus, the insured's conduct would not have
amounted to a breach even if the clause had covered third-party
practice.
If there is any, ambiguity in an insurance contract, it will be
construed according to the understanding of the average person,40 and
the insurer will not get the benefit of any doubt. 41  Since the instant
case seems to be the first time that it was claimed a co-operation
clause could compel impleader, and the clause did not specifically refer
to it, it would seem that the decision, though technical, is correct.
Again, it was conceded that, under the subrogation clause, the insured
would have been compelled to co-operate in a suit against his mother
after payment by the insurer. The very fact that the policy only re-
ferred to such an obligation in the event of payment lends support to
the view of the majority.
One further question suggested itself in this case. The insured
also claimed that he should not be compelled to verify a complaint
against his mother since, as the driver, she was covered by his policy.
Such an action, it was contended, would result in circuity of action
since the insurer would be liable to the mother for any recovery
against her. 42  As the insurer argued, however, the better view is that
37 "Assistance and Cooperation of the Insured. The insured shall cooperate
with the company and, upon the company's request, shall attend hearings and
trials and shall assist in effecting settlements, securing and giving evidence,
obtaining the attendance of witnesses and in the conduct of suits. . . ." American
Surety Co. v. Diamond, 1 N.Y.2d 594, 596, 136 N.E2d 876, 878 (1956).
3s Although the opinion refers to the complaint as both a third-party com-
plaint and a cross-claim, it would seem that the latter designation is erroneous.
A cross-claim is asserted against one already a party. See PRASHKM, NEw
YORK PRArICE 298 (3d ed. 1954). Here the mother, as executrix, was a party
in a representative capacity, not individually. See Keating v. Stevenson, 21 App.
Div. 604 (1st Dep't 1897).
39 "The parties to a question in difference which might be the subject of an
action or special proceeding, being of full age, may agree upon a case con-
taining a statement of the facts upon which the controversy depends; and may
present a written submission thereof to a court of record which would have
jurisdiction of an action or special proceeding brought for the same cause....
40 See Lachs v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 306 N.Y. 357, 118 N.E.2d 555 (1954).
41 "To sustain the construction which the lower courts have placed upon the
clause, the burden was on the defendant to establish that the words and ex-
pressions used not only are susceptible of that construction but that it is the
only construction that can fairly be placed thereon." Hartol Products Corp. v.
Prudential Ins. Co.. 290 N.Y. 44, 49, 47 N.E.2d 687, 690 (1943).
42 See Maryland Cas. Co. v. Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 208 F.2d
731 (2d Cir. 1953) ; cf. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pearson, 194 F.2d 284 (2d Cir.
1952)
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the company would not be liable for any damage sustained by the
driver's spouse on a direct action.43 The authorities would also seem
to cover the case of indirect suit through the spouse's son.44
Although the principal case is a novel and interesting one, it
seems that its effect on the law will not be lasting. By the simple
expedient of amending the co-operation clause to include co-operation
in third-party practice, insurers can remedy the problem raised by this
case. There is little doubt that they will do just that.
M
INSURANCE - SECTION 167(3) OF INSURANCE LAW - HELD
APPLICABLE TO ACCIDENTS IN OTHER JURIsDIcTIONS. - Plaintiff-
insurer issued, in New York, a liability policy to defendant's wife on
her automobile. Defendant is suing his wife in Connecticut for in-
juries received from the wife's negligent operation of the vehicle.
Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment denying liability on the ground
that the policy did not expressly insure the wife against the husband's
suit as required by Section 167(3) of the Ndw York Insurance Law.
The appellate division in reversing the judgment for the defendant
held that the requirements of Section 167(3) also applied to accidents
occurring outside the jurisdiction, thereby relieving the plaintiff of
all liability. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Stecker, 1 A.D.2d 629,
152 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1st Dep't 1956).*
At common law, New York courts did not recognize a personal
injury action by one spouse against the other,' even though the injury
occurred in a jurisdiction which granted the right to maintain such
action.2  The tort was recognized; but the married parties were con-
43 "No policy or contract shall be deemed to insure against any liability of
an insured because of death of or injuries to his or her spouse or because of
injury to, or destruction of property of his or her spouse unless express pro-
vision relating specifically thereto is included in the policy." N.Y. Iqs. LAw§ 167(3). See Feinman v. Bernard Rice Sons, Inc., 133 N.Y.S.2d 639, aff'd,
285 App. Div. 926, 139 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1st Dep't 1955); Katz v. Wessel, 207
Misc. 456, 139 N.Y.S2d 564 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
44 This would follow from the strict construction given the statute by the
courts. See, e.g., Fuchs v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co., 258' App. Div.
603, 605, 17 N.Y.S.2d 338 (2d Dep't 1940) ; Peka, Inc. v. Kaye, 208 Misc. 1003,
145 N.Y.S.2d 156 (Sup. Ct. 1955), reVd on other grounds, 1 A.D.2d 879, 150
N.Y.S.2d 774 (1st Dep't 1956); Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Newman, 47 N.Y.S.2d
804 (Sup. Ct.), aft'd, 268 App. Div. 967, 51 N.Y.S.2d 767 (1st Dep't 1944).
• On appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.
See, e.g., Caplan v. Caplan 268 N.Y. 445, 198 N.E. 23 (1935); Allen v.
Allen, 246 N.Y. 571, 159 N.E. 656 (1927) (mene. opinion); Perlman v. Brook-
lyn City R.R., 117 Misc. 353, 191 N.Y. Supp. 891 (Sup. Ct. 1Q21), aff'd mein.,
202 App. Div. 822, 194 N.Y. Supp. 971 (2d Dep't 1922).
2 Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936).
19571
